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REcENT CASES
not forget the closeness of the Olmstead"6 decision where the Court
ruled that wiretapping fell outside the protection of the fourth amend-
ment. But is not wiretapping as great an intrusion on the right of
privacy as an unconstitutional search and seizure? Would the Court's
decision be the same as in Olmstead if it were to reappraise the issue?
One might anticipate that the Court will provide the answer to these
questions in the very near future.
The victory of Pugach may be short-lived. Law enforcement officials
may once again be compelled to fight twentieth century crime with
nineteenth century methods.37 Undoubtedly the battle over wiretap-
ping is just beginning. Many advocates urge as a solution to the prob-
lem what may be considered a middle-of-the-road position. While
urging on the one hand that the Supreme Court take the initiative in
enforcing the federal statute by ruling inadmissible such evidence
unlawfully obtained by state officials and violative of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, they also seek legislation by
Congress which would permit restricted and controlled wiretapping by
authorized officials in a limited number of situations such as espionage,
narcotics and kidnappings. Warrants should be required, and such
warrants should be issued only by a federal judge or a designated
member of the Federal Communications Commission. Such a statute
would enable law enforcement officials to use wiretapping, while at
the same time providing adequate safeguards to insure the protection
of constitutional and statutory rights38
K. Sidney Neuman
Loss OF CONSORTIUM TO WIFE CAUSED BY NEGIGENCE OF TmRD PA.IrY
-Plaintiff's husband, a fireman, was severely injured while attempting
to extinguish a fire caused by the defendant's negligence. Plaintiff
brought suit for loss of consortium. From a summary judgment dis-
missing her action, the plaintiff appealed. Held: Reversed. Where a
wife's conjugal interest is invaded by the negligent act of a third party,
386Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The historic dissents
by Justices Holmes and Brandeis may well serve as a basis for overruling Olmstead
in a future decision. Justice Douglas, in particular, has continued to strive to
bring wiretapping within the protection of the fourth amendment. He states that
this would be an effective solution to the wiretapping problem only if Wolf v.
Colorado were reversed. Douglas, The Right of the People 150 (1952).
37 See Silver, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Prosecutor's View,
44 Minn. L. Rev. 835 (1960); Rogers, The Case for Wiretapping, 63 Yale L.J.
792 (1953).
38 See 100 Cong. Rec. 4156 (1954), where Senator McCarren discusses a bill
he introduced in the 83rd Congress. While the bill proposed a system similar to




she has the right to recover damages for her loss of consortium. Dini
v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881 (II. 1961).
By permitting the wife to sue for loss of consortium, the Supreme
Court of Illinois broke away from a long line of precedent in the United
States denying a wife this cause of action,' and chose to follow the
federal decision of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.
2
The last time the Kentucky Court of Appeals was confronted with
this issue was in La Eace v. Cincinnati, N. & C. Ry.,3 when it decided
not to follow the Hitaffer case. The court, instead, elected to follow
the rule in existence in Kentucky and other jurisdictions, holding in
no uncertain terms that a wife could not sue for loss of consortium
caused by the negligent act of a third party.
4
The purpose of this comment is to evaluate the right of a wife to
sue for loss of consortium in light of the recent Dini case and other
decisions which have accepted the modem approach of the Hitaffer
case. A review of these cases will indicate that when the Kentucky
court is again faced with the question it would be justified in overrul-
ing the La Eace case.
There are several arguments used for denying this cause of action
to a wife in a negligence case which have been considered by recent
decisions. The first is the contention that a wife's interest is too remote
from the injury to her husband to warrant protection. This contention
has been rejected by several recent cases5 for the simple reason that
the same injury to the husband's interest has never been regarded as
too remote when he brings such an action. It is wholly inconsistent
to say that such injuries to a wife are remote and at the same time
maintain that such injuries to a husband are not too remote for a cause
of action to exist.6 Surely the right of consortium with a spouse is as
valuable to a wife as it is to a husband.
A second reason given for denying the wifes recovery is based on a
fear of double recovery for the same injury. This argument assumes
that if the husband recovers in his own action for injuries received to
' A large number of cases are cited in the principal case at 170 N.E.2d 881,
889.
2 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
a 249 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1952).
4 For a discussion of the problem in Kentucky prior to 1950, see 35 Ky. L.J.
220 (1947). When this comment was written in 1947, only one case could be
cited allowing the wife to recover in negligent actions, Hipp v. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921), and it was overruled by
Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
5 Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448, 450 (D. Neb. 1953); Acuff v.
Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480, 485 (1956); Montgomery v. Stephans,
359 Mich. 83, 101 N.W.2d 227, 231 (1960); Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 98 N.W.2d
669, 679 (S.D. 1959).6 Dini v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881, 891 (I1I. 1961).
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compensate for his diminished ability to support his family, then the
wife should not be able to recover anything. This argument has also
been rejected by recent decisions7 on the ground that the wife's right
to consortium involves a great deal more than mere support. The court
in the principal case pointed out that any conceivable double recovery
could be prevented by merely "deducting from the computation of
damages in the consortium action any compensation given her husband
in his action for the impairment of his ability to support."8
A third important argument for denying the recovery is based on
the contention that any remedy the wife may acquire can only come
from the legislature. This argument was made in Hoelcstra v. Helge-
landd but the court refused to give it any weight by stating:
We believe we would be denying a present-day common-law right of
action if we held that a wife cannot recover for loss of consortium due
to the husband's negligent injury. Thus the only matter for the legis-
lature would be the denial of the wife's light of action and not the
allowance thereof.o (Emphasis added.)
This feeling that the wife's right to bring the action does not rest
in the legislature is shared by the court in the Dini case where it is
stated that since "the obstacles to the wife's action were 'judge in-
vented,' there is no conceivable reason why they cannot be 'judge
destroyed."'l
Other arguments could be discussed, especially those based on
common-law dogma,' 2 but the three dealt with above are the most
difficult hurdles for a wife to cross in bringing this action.
No matter how well the arguments are rebutted, however, the fact
still remains that a court can deny the action on precedent alone if it
is so disposed. Disregarding precedent has been a major task for
every court which has accepted the Hitaffer case and granted recovery.
Statements by various courts in making this determination are not only
inspiring but are also paving the way for other courts to follow. In
Montgomery v. Stephan,13 for example, the court recognized the vast
number of cases denying the wife's recovery but nevertheless stated:
7 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Cooney v.
Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448, 450-51 (D. Neb. 1953); Bailey v. Wilson, 100 Ga.
App. 405, 111 S.E.2d 106, 108-09 (1959); Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78
N.W.2d 480, 485 (1956); Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 98 N.W.2d 669, 679 (S.D.
1959).8 Dini v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881, 891 (IMI. 1961).
9 98 N.W.2d 669 (S.D. 1959).
10 Id. at 683.
11 Dini v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881, 892 (IMI. 1961).
12 The reasons given for denying a wife the right to sue in her own behalf
are discussed in 35 Ky. L.J. 220 (1947).
13 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960).
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Were we to rule upon precedent alone, were stability the only reason
for our being, we would have no trouble with this case. We would
simply tell the woman to begone, and to take her shattered husband
with her, that we need no longer be affronted by a sight so repulsive.
In so doing we would have vast support from the dusty books. But
dust [seic] the decision would remain in our mouths through the years
ahead, a reproach to law and conscience alike. Our oath is to do
justice, not to perpetuate error.
14
A similar feeling was expresed in Brown P. Georgia-Tennessee
Coaches15 where the court stated: "[W] e do indeed have a 'charge to
keep,' but that charge is not to perpetuate error or to allow our reason-
ing or conscience to decay or to turn deft ears to new light and new
life."16
In Acuff v. Schmit,17 the court pointed out that loss of consortium is
the gravamen of an action for alienation of affection; an action which
is certainly available to a wife. On holding that a wife could also
bring an action for loss of consortium due to a negligent injury to her
husband the court stated:
While we recognize the almost total lack of precedent for allow-
ing appellant's cause of action, we deem precedent to be worthy of
support only when it can stand the scrutiny of logic and sound
reasoning in the light of present day standards and ideals.... [T]he
reasoning and logic advanced by the great weight of authority denying
relief is not [sound].1s
The statements 9 made by these highly competent courts are clear
recognition that the law on any particular subject should not become
stagnant. At present many women have achieved higher attainments
than men; they are no longer subservient and unable to go into court
alone. Therefore, it is only reasonable that a wife should have the same
right as her husband to sue for loss of consortium due to negligence.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals should be less hesitant to disregard
precedent now than it was in 1952 in view of its decision in Brown v.
Gosser2° in 1953. There, the court broke with the past and allowed a
woman to sue her spouse for a personal injurr caused by her husband's
negligence.2' In so holding, the court pointed out that precedent "is
'4 Id. at -, 101 N.W.2d at 229.
1588 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1958).
16 Id. at -, 77 S.E.2d at 32. The Brown case has been followed by
Georgia in Bailey v. Wilson, 100 Ga. App. 405, 111 S.E.2d 106 (1959), and
Gordy v. Powell, 95 Ga. App. 822, 99 S.E.2d 313 (1957).
17248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956).
18 Id. at -, 78 N.W.2d at 485.
19 See also Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Missouri
Pacific Transp. Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957).
20262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953), noted in 42 Ky. L.J. 497 (1954).




not a universal, inexorable command."2 2 Since a wife can now sue her
husband for a negligent injury, there is strong reason for maintaining
that she can sue a third party for depriving her of her personal right
to consortium with her husband. If she can sue in one instance, she
should be able to sue in the other. A wife's action for loss of con-
sortium is not an attempt to recover damages which only the husband
is entitled to recover.23 It is no different from an action for loss of
consortium caused by an intentional tort, such as alienation of affection,
which the Kentucky court readily recognizes.
24
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Dini case is another step in
establishing a new rule of law which has been long overdue. A wife's
right to the consortium of her spouse is a personal right entitled to
the protection of the law. The Kentucky Court of Appeals has ex-
pressed a modem attitude by allowing a wife to sue for a negligent
injury inflicted by her husband and it is therefore only proper that a
right of action should also be recognized where her injury is caused
by the negligent act of a third party.
William M. Dishman, Jr.
22 Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Ky. 1953).23 Bailey v. Wilson, 100 Ga. App. 405, 111 S.E.2d 106 (1959).24 Cravens v. Louisville & N.R.R., 195 Ky. 257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922).
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